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THE DATA BREACH EPIDEMIC: A MODERN LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Laura A. Hendee* 
Abstract 
This Note sheds light on the major legal issues surrounding the 
numerous data breaches that plague our modern technology-driven 
society. Current laws in the United States vary widely in how they handle 
the resolution of harm to unsuspecting victims of data breaches. The issue 
of Article III standing is commonly at the forefront of the conflict and 
discussion in this area, which has resulted in a substantial circuit split in 
the United States. The newly enacted California Consumer Privacy Act 
will likely have a major impact in this area of the law and will 
undoubtedly influence how consumers’ personal information is handled 
in the years to come. 
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It seems like every day there is a new article headline in the news or 
new email in your inbox stating something to the effect of, “Company X 
Announces New Data Breach,” or the even more alarming, “We found 
your information in another company’s data breach.” In reality, it does 
not just seem like it: on average, there are new company data breaches 
every day.1 In fact, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse reports that there have 
been over 9,600 data breaches since 2005, exposing over 11,500,000,000 
personal records.2 These are disturbing statistics, and as the variety of 
industries and types of businesses impacted by breaches each year 
continue to increase, many consumers are beginning to realize that such 
breaches have become “the new normal.”3 The question is not “if” a 
breach will occur, but “when” a breach will occur.4  
A “data breach” is defined as “a confirmed incident in which sensitive, 
confidential or otherwise protected data has been accessed and/or 
disclosed in an unauthorized fashion.”5 They can be caused by many 
things, including but not limited to weak passwords, missing software 
patches that are exploited, lost or stolen electronic devices, unauthorized 
exposure during information transit, hackers exploiting unsecured 
wireless networks, and social engineering (i.e., email phishing).6 With so 
many data breaches occurring each year, several of them large in terms 
of the number of impacted individuals and the volume of data acquired, 
it follows that a number of those individuals are taking action.7 Such data 
breaches frequently make headlines and provoke litigation brought by 
 
 1. See Davey Winder, Data Breaches Expose 4.1 Billion Records in First Six Months of 
2019, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2019, 6:31 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2019/08/20/ 
data-breaches-expose-41-billion-records-in-first-six-months-of-2019/. See also Daniel Funke, By 
the Numbers: How Common Are Data Breaches—and What Can You Do About Them?, 
POLITIFACT (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/article/2019/sep/23/numbers-how-
common-are-data-breaches-and-what-can-/. 
 2. See Daniel Funke, supra note 1. 
 3. See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2018 END-OF-YEAR DATA BREACH REPORT 
(Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ITRC_2018-End-of-
Year-Aftermath_FINAL_V2_combinedWEB.pdf. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Margaret Rouse, Essential Guide: GDPR Compliance Requirements for CRM 
Managers—Definition: Data Breach, SEARCHSECURITY, (last updated May 2019) 
https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/data-breach. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See David Balser et al., Insight: Data Breach Litigation Trends to Watch, BLOOMBERG 









consumers, often leading to large class action lawsuits.8 After the passage 
of the Class Action Fairness Act,9 most data breach lawsuits have been 
brought in federal court.10 Because of the lack of clarity provided by 
courts and legislatures in the area of data privacy litigation, some of the 
most noteworthy data breach litigation developments in 2018 resulted in 
large consumer class action settlements.11 This settlement trend will 
likely continue unless further guidance is provided or a more clearly 
defined legal standard develops surrounding the implementation of 
reasonable security measures that are effective in the current state of 
advancing technology and cybersecurity.12  
One of the major reasons for the lack of clarity regarding data breach 
litigation outcomes across the country spurs from the circuit split on the 
issue of standing.13 Courts dismiss many of these data breach cases 
because plaintiffs lack a cognizable injury-in-fact, which is a major 
component for Article III standing.14 Generally, the First, Second, Fourth, 
and Eighth Circuits have rejected a finding of standing on the particular 
facts of the cases heard in these circuits, while leaving the door open for 
future cases, noting that the assessment of risk of future harm is a fact-
specific inquiry.15 Conversely, the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. 
Circuits have held that, based on the facts of the particular cases, the risk 
of future harm from a data breach was an injury sufficient for standing.16 
The split regarding the existence of a cognizable injury centers around 
the risk of future identity theft, risk of future fraud, monitoring 
expenditures, and other similar costs.17 Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
turned down the opportunity to opine on this subject, further solidifying 
the circuit split.18  
 
 8. Id. 
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2011) (extending federal diversity jurisdiction to all class actions 
in which minimal diversity exists and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million).  
 10. Megan Dowty, Life is Short. Go to Court: Establishing Article III Standing in Data 
Breach Cases, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 686 (2017).  
 11. See Balser et al., supra note 7. 
 12. See Balser et al., supra note 7. 
 13. David L. Silverman, Developments in Data Security Breach Liability, 74 BUS. L. 217, 
217 (2018). 
 14. Dowty, supra note 10, at 686. 
 15. See Silverman, supra note 13; see infra Part II (discussing specific relevant cases from 
each circuit in the circuit split). 
 16. See sources cited supra note 15. 
 17. Dowty, supra note 10, at 686–87. 
 18. See, e.g., Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. 
Ct. 981 (2018). 
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Some states, such as California, are passing stricter consumer privacy 
laws that will likely impact the future of data privacy litigation in those 
particular jurisdictions.19 There have also been attempts to pass federal 
legislation that would potentially preempt state laws, but so far none of 
those attempts have succeeded.20 Despite this lack of a clearly defined 
national standard, companies need to start employing techniques that will 
reduce their litigation exposure. Some options for accomplishing this 
include the implementation of a minimum level of security controls21 and 
careful drafting of arbitration clauses and class action waivers22 in the 
company’s terms and conditions.  
I.  DATA BREACHES, IMPACT OF INFORMATION THEFT & CURRENT 
GOVERNING LAW 
A.  Data Breaches: Prevalence Today & Resulting Costs to Victims 
As data breaches and hacks continue to occur, the privacy of our 
personal information remains constantly at risk, even if we believe the 
companies that we share our data with are trustworthy and 
technologically adept. Hackers continue to improve their skills and find 
new unpredictable methods of using technology to procure personal 
information from companies and individuals.23 Unfortunately, the rate of 
technological development by these hackers seems to consistently 
outpace the policy makers in this area. This contributes to the general 
tensions on the subject and begs the question of why there has been so 
little progress in preventing data breaches and the thefts that often 
follow.24 For example, in the last five years alone there have been several 
major corporate data breaches involving companies such as Target, 
Yahoo!, Home Depot, Sony Pictures and Entertainment, Anthem Health 
 
 19. See generally California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 
(West 2018).  
 20. See Stephen Jones, Data Breaches, Bitcoin, and Blockchain Technology: A Modern 
Approach to the Data-Security Crisis, 50 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 783, 793–94 (2018). 
 21. See KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUST., CALIFORNIA DATA BREACH REPORT 31 
(Feb. 2016), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/dbr/2016-data-breach-report.pdf. 
 22. See Alexis Buese, Calif. Privacy Law Will Likely Prompt Flood of Class Actions, 
LAW360 (May 15, 2019, 11:41 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1159313/calif-privacy-
law-will-likely-prompt-flood-of-class-actions. 
 23. See Jon L. Mills & Kelsey Harclerode, Privacy, Mass Intrusion, and the Modern Data 
Breach, 69 FLA. L. REV. 771, 773 (2017). 
 24. Id. at 773. 
 
 





Insurance, HSBC Finance Corporation, Ashley Madison, and Equifax, 
just to name a few.25 
Data breaches impact both the consumers whose records are exposed 
and the companies whose lack of appropriate security measures lead to 
the particular breach. The companies who are hacked, and ultimately leak 
such consumer information, are exposed to great financial harm.26 The 
average cost to businesses per leaked record is reported at $150,27 and the 
global cost of data breaches is estimated to increase to $2.1 trillion28 by 
the end of 2019. These figures have consistently increased since 2017 and 
this trend may continue.29 Further, customers with compromised credit 
card information or other personal data because of a data breach are often 
reluctant to do business with the same company, thus severing the 
relationship and resulting in the loss of a customer’s lifetime value for the 
business.30  
Repercussions on the consumer side typically center around the risk 
of future identity theft or fraud and the corresponding identity theft 
monitoring expenses, temporary account cancellations, and generalized 
stress and anxiety post-breach.31 This is especially concerning given the 
general population’s dependence on the Internet and will likely have the 
greatest impact on future generations. Future generations are at risk of 
serious identity theft issues that may occur when these individuals are 
still very young, which in turn may potentially impact their future ability 
to obtain loans or purchase homes, cars, and other valuable assets later in 
life that require an inquiry into credit scores.32 All parties to a data breach 
suffer to some degree, and it is up to the policy-makers of the country to 
ultimately combat these issues by passing effective standards that will 
help protect future individuals from becoming victims of such harmful 
actions. 
 
 25. Id. at 780–83. 
 26. See Jones, supra note 20, at 789. 
 27. IBM SECURITY, COST OF A DATA BREACH REPORT 13 (2019), 
https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/ZBZLY7KL. 
 28. Shayla Price, The Real Cost of Ecommerce Data Breaches, Espionage, and Security 
Mismanagement, BIGCOMMERCE: ECOMMERCE SECURITY BLOG, https://www.bigcommerce.com 
/blog/data-breaches/#the-costs-of-a-data-breach (last visited Apr. 2, 2020). 
 29. IBM SECURITY, supra note 27, at 19. 
 30. See Price, supra note 28. 
 31. See Jones, supra note 20, at 788; Dowty, supra note 10, at 686; Price, supra note 28. 
 32. Jones, supra note 20, at 788–89; see also Danielle Wiener-Bronner, Why Millennials 




58 JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 24 
 
 
B.  Impact of Information Theft: The Hacker’s Timeline 
So, what actually happens after consumer personal information is 
stolen in a company’s data breach? Hackers use the information in a 
variety of ways. They may: (1) use the stolen information to interfere with 
business operations, for example, hackers commonly sell internal 
business plans, forecasts, and market analyses to competitors; (2) steal 
data for the purposes of extortion, for example, ransomware attacks 
where the hacker demands payment if the company wants to unlock the 
stolen or restricted files; or (3) target consumer data like names, 
addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, passwords, credit card 
numbers, and social security numbers to leverage such information for 
financial gain on the dark web, which often results in identity theft that is 
sold to the highest bidder.33 Of further concern, identity thieves often 
exploit stolen information within minutes of obtaining it.34  
The Federal Trade Commission’s Office of Technology Research & 
Investigation (FTC’s Tech. Office) performed an experiment in 2017 to 
discover what actually happens when stolen personal information is made 
public and how quickly thieves attempt to make unauthorized use of the 
information.35 The FTC’s Tech. Office created personal information 
belonging to 100 fake people that was designed to look like a stolen 
database of consumer credentials and posted that information on a site 
frequented by hackers on two occasions.36 For two weeks after they 
posted to the site, the FTC’s Tech. Office monitored “all email access 
attempts, payment account access attempts, attempted credit card 
charges, and texts and calls received by phone numbers.”37 The first 
posting of information received about 100 views, and the second posting 
received about 550 views.38 After the initial posting, it only took 90 
minutes for the first unauthorized attempt to use the stolen fake 
information; then, after the second posting, it only took nine minutes.39 
Furthermore, the total number of attempts to use the information totaled 
 
 33. See Price, supra note 28. 
 34. See Lesley Fair, Sensitive Consumer Data Posted Online (and the FTC Knows Who Did 
It), FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: BUS. BLOG (May 24, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/05/sensitive-consumer-data-posted-online-ftc-knows-
who-did-it. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 
 





119 in the first week and 1,108 in the second week.40 Tracking of 
attempted illegal purchases over the two weeks lead to a variety of 
categories of charges, with the top five including: (1) retailers; (2) 
unknown; (3) gaming; (4) entertainment; and (5) e-payment services.41 
The experiment revealed how incredibly fast large amounts of stolen 
personal information can spread across the dark web. The above 
experiment only used the data of 100 hypothetical victims of information 
theft and only tracked the impact for two weeks following the posting of 
the information. For a startling perspective, the Equifax data breach 
exposed personal information of approximately 147 million individuals 
and that breach occurred two years ago in 2017.42 The number of attempts 
of unauthorized use of such information from that one data breach alone 
is likely massive and will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the lives 
of those real breach victims. 
C.  Current Data Breach Laws in the United States 
Federal data breach regulations are limited in their scope and apply 
almost exclusively to industries such as banking, finance, healthcare, and 
credit reporting.43 Such statutes typically mandate that companies in each 
industry implement reasonable procedures to protect consumer 
information from prohibited disclosure.44 Though this seems like a 
regulation that would result in something positive, it lacks any 
explanation or examples of what would qualify as “reasonable 
procedures” and it lacks guidance on how companies should assess their 
vulnerability for future data breaches.45 The ambiguity of these federal 
statutes creates confusion and reinforces the wide array of security 
standards used nationwide, which are often effective.  
If consumers recognize that they are victims of such statutory 
violations under the industry-specific federal law and bring a complaint 
against a company, they usually face an additional hurdle when arguing 
for federal standing and the interpretation of the injury requirement.46 The 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Lesley Fair, $575 Million Equifax Settlement Illustrates Security Basics for Your 
Business, FED. TRADE COMMISSION: BUS. BLOG (July 22, 2019, 6:48 AM), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2019/07/575-million-equifax-settlement-
illustrates-security-basics. 
 43. Jones, supra note 20, at 792. 
 44. See Jones, supra note 20, at 792. 
 45. See Jones, supra note 20, at 792. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a). 
 46. See infra Section II.A. 
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Supreme Court of the United States has arrived at conflicting conclusions 
in regard to what actually satisfies this requirement, which has resulted 
in a federal circuit split.47 Inevitably this adds to the outcome uncertainty 
for both plaintiffs and defendants, and since companies typically settle 
their disputes out of court,48 courts have not been able to give opinions 
regarding their judgment on the merits of these claims. Notably, this 
impacts future litigation because the judicial system has not yet had the 
opportunity to interpret the meaning of what “reasonable procedures” 
should be in place to satisfy what is mandated by the federal statutes for 
protection of consumer personal information.  
Every state (plus the District of Columbia and a number of United 
States Territories) has enacted legislation requiring entities to notify 
victims of security breaches that release personally identifiable 
information.49 Each state’s laws on security breaches usually set forth 
who must comply with the law, a definition of what constitutes 
“personally identifiable information” (which, surprisingly, varies state to 
state), what constitutes a breach, timing and appropriate method of notice, 
and certain exemptions.50 Companies involved in a data breach are 
expected to comply with the various data-related statutes for each state 
where they do business.51 However, the large range of varying regulations 
in this area, coupled with the added confusion related to standing present 
a burden for both the breached companies and the consumers seeking 
relief.52  
Though data breach laws at the state level vary, they typically share 
the exception that notification is only required when compromised data 
was not encrypted (or when the encryption key was also compromised in 
the breach).53 A number of state statutes require companies that collect 
consumer personal information to implement “reasonable procedures” to 
 
 47. Jones, supra note 20, at 794–95; see Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 440–
41 (2013) (suggesting a high burden of proof to meet the "certainly impeding" harm requirement); 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (holding that though the plaintiff alleged a 
federal statutory violation by the defendant, a concrete injury must also be shown); see also infra 
Section II.A.  
 48. See Jones, supra note 20, at 793. 
 49. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29, 2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/ security-breach-
notification-laws.aspx [hereinafter NCSL]. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Jones, supra note 20, at 791–92; see generally NCSL, supra note 49 (showing the 
varying statutes related to this subject for each state). 
 52. See Jones, supra note 20, at 792. 
 53. Jones, supra note 20, at 796. 
 
 





protect the information.54 However, similar to the federal statutes that 
require such “reasonable procedures,” the state laws do not provide any 
guidance regarding the types of procedures considered reasonable and 
they also do not shed light on how companies should assess their 
vulnerability for future data breaches.55 And the most notable differences 
across the state statutes are how broad or narrow they define “personal 
information,” whether they provide consumers with an express cause of 
action, the severity of the penalties for violations, and the range of time 
that breached companies have to notify consumers and regulatory 
agencies of the breach.56  
The state of Florida’s data and personal information protection 
statutes are typical examples of what any state statutes may look like in 
this area. These data breach laws apply to any entity that acquires, 
maintains, stores, or uses personal information.57 Entities are required to 
take “reasonable measures” to protect and secure data in electronic form 
containing personal information.58 The statute defines “breach of 
security” or “breach” as unauthorized access of data in electronic form 
containing personal information, with an exception for certain situations 
where information is accessed in good faith by employees or agents.59 It 
does not apply to encrypted or redacted information, or information 
secured in some other way that renders it unreadable (as long as the 
encryption key is not also compromised).60 Within the statute “personal 
information” is defined as an individual’s first and last name or first initial 
and last name plus one or more of the following: Social Security number, 
driver’s license or passport number, military identification number, any 
similar form of government identification number that can be used to 
verify the individual’s identity, financial account number or credit or 
debit card number with any security codes required, medical information, 
or health insurance policies or subscriber identification numbers.61 
Additionally, personal information may also include a username or e-mail 
address, in combination with a password or security question and answer 
 
 54. Jones, supra note 20, at 796−97. 
 55. Jones, supra note 20, at 797.  
 56. Jones, supra note 20, at 796−97. 
 57. FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(b) (2019). 
 58. Id. § 501.171(2). The vague “reasonable measures” language, id., provides little 
guidance to businesses for best prevention practices. 
 59. Id. § 501.171(1)(a). 
 60. Id. § 501.171(1)(g)(2). 
 61. Id. § 501.171(1)(g)(1)(a). 
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that would permit access to an online account.62 Florida’s statute does not 
provide a private cause of action.63  
Florida’s notification requirement varies depending on whether the 
breached entity is notifying an individual or a regulatory agency.64 For 
individuals, notifications must be given in writing to each individual in 
the state whose personal information was, or if the entity reasonably 
believes it was, accessed as a result of the breach.65 The notice shall be 
made “as expeditiously as practicable and without unreasonable 
delay . . . but no later than 30 days after the determination of the breach 
or reason to believe the breach occurred” and must include the date(s) of 
the breach, a description of the personal information accessed or believed 
to be accessed, and contact information for the breached entity.66 For 
regulators, the breached entity must notify the Florida Department of 
Legal Affairs no later than 30 days following the identification of the 
breach if 500 or more individuals within the state are affected by the 
breach.67 Further, third parties that maintain personal information on 
behalf of the breached entity must notify that entity no later than 10 days 
after determination of the breach.68 Violations of the notice requirement 
may result in civil penalties and are considered “unfair or deceptive trade 
practices.”69 The civil penalties may consist of up to $1,000 per day for 
each day up to the first 30 days following a violation and $50,000 for 
each subsequent 30-day period or portion thereof for up to 180 days, 
capping at a ceiling of $500,000.70 These penalties are per breach, not per 
affected individual.71  
The difficulties that both consumers and businesses must overcome 
from the current data breach regulations on the federal and state levels 
are clear. Unfortunately, the subsequent path going forward after 
overcoming those difficulties is not so clear. The following sections of 
this Article summarize and examine the split among the federal circuit 
courts, the forthcoming state regulations that will likely have a substantial 
impact on data protection laws across the country, and the potential 
 
 62. Id. § 501.171(1)(g)(1)(b). 
 63. Id. § 501.171(10). 
 64. Compare FLA. STAT. § 501.171(3), with FLA. STAT. § 501.171(4). 
 65. Id. § 501.171(4)(a), (d). 
 66. Id. § 501.171(4)(a), (e). 
 67. Id. § 501.171(3)(a). Fifteen additional days may be allowed if there is good cause for 
delay provided in writing to the department within 30 days after determination of the breach or 
reason to believe a breach occurred. Id. 
 68. Id. § 501.171(6)(a). 
 69. Id. § 501.171(9)(a). 
 70. Id. § 501.171(9)(b). 
 71. Id. § 501.171(9). 





measures that companies can implement to mitigate their litigation 
exposure in this area. 
II.  A SPLIT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
Data breach cases typically include one or more of three different 
categories of alleged injuries: (1) the plaintiff’s personal or financial 
information has been stolen by a third party, and that party has used that 
information illegally (i.e. to make purchases using the plaintiff’s money); 
(2) the plaintiff’s information has been accessed but that information has 
not been used (i.e. to open bank accounts, make unauthorized purchases, 
or otherwise harm the plaintiff), yet, the plaintiff still claims other forms 
of damages (i.e. incurring costs for credit-monitoring services, paying the 
cost of cancelling and receiving new bank bards, suffering loss of reward 
points from cancelled cards, and experiencing general anxiety that their 
information will be used in an unauthorized manner in the future); and 
(3) the plaintiff brings a suit based on a belief that his information is not 
being protected and a third party could potentially access it in the future.72 
From these above categories of injuries, those in (1) involve an injury 
sufficient to meet the injury-in-fact requirement, those in (2) are the type 
of injuries involved in the circuit split that focuses on whether the indirect 
costs and expenses are sufficient to meet the injury-in-fact requirement, 
and those in (3) are the least likely to meet the injury-in-fact 
requirement.73  
The lack of a uniform standard set by the Supreme Court for what 
constitutes injury in the context of data breaches has resulted in a circuit 
split as to how much injury is sufficient for standing purposes. Generally, 
the First, Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have consistently rejected 
a finding of standing for alleged injury categories (2) and (3) above, while 
emphasizing that the assessment of risk of future harm is a fact-specific 
inquiry.74 Conversely, the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have 
consistently held that the alleged injury category (2)—risk of future harm 
from a data breach that has already occurred—was an injury sufficient 
for standing.75  
 
 72. Caroline C. Cease, Note, Giving Out Your Number: A Look at the Current State of Data 
Breach Litigation, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395, 398, 399, 404 (2014). 
 73. Id. at 398, 399, 404. 
 74. Silverman, supra note 13, at 217. 
 75. Silverman, supra note 13, at 217. 
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A.  First Things First: Standing 
1.  The “Injury-in-Fact” Requirement 
The Constitution establishes Article III standing as a “threshold 
question in every federal court case.”76 To satisfy this standing 
requirement, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury that is: (1) concrete, 
particularized and actual or imminent (as opposed to merely conjectural 
or hypothetical); (2) fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the 
defendant; and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling.77 Standing 
issues for data breach cases usually center around the first requirement—
that there is an “injury-in-fact.” However, the Supreme Court has not yet 
directly ruled on this subject in the context of a data breach.  
Many data breach cases addressed by lower courts have relied on 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA for guidance on analyzing the 
existence of a sufficient injury-in-fact.78 Clapper involved a United States 
citizen who engaged in sensitive international communications with 
individuals whom they believed might be the targets of American 
surveillance at some point in the future under the 2008 Amendments to 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.79 The plaintiffs claimed to 
have suffered an injury-in-fact because of a reasonable likelihood that 
their communications with foreign contacts would be intercepted, and 
because the risk of surveillance required them to take costly and 
burdensome actions to protect the confidentiality of their 
communications.80 However, there was no evidence that the plaintiffs’ 
communications had been targeted or that the government was going to 
target their communications in the future.81  
As a result, the Court held in a 5-4 decision that the plaintiffs did not 
have standing under Article III.82 The Court “reiterated that [the] 
‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury-in-
fact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not 
sufficient.”83 Specifically, the Court found that plaintiffs’ theory of future 
injury was “too speculative,” and not actual or “certainly impending,” 
with the plaintiffs’ allegations for standing based on a “highly attenuated 
 
 76. United States v. One Lincoln Navigator 1998, 328 F.3d 1011, 1013 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 77. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010).  
 78. See generally Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
 79. Id. at 401–05. 
 80. Id. at 401. 
 81. Id. at 411. 
 82. Id. 
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chain of possibilities.”84 Further, the Court found that plaintiffs’ 
“contention that they have standing because they incurred certain costs 
as a reasonable reaction to a risk of harm [was] unavailing . . . [because 
they] cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on 
themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not 
certainly impending.”85 
Since Clapper, cases have been inconsistent on the issue of Article III 
standing and the injury-in-fact requirement. The injury-in-fact analysis is 
very fact-specific in nature, with some courts finding no standing on 
imminence grounds, reasoning that the plaintiff had suffered no actual 
injury, while others find standing in cases involving similar facts and 
claims. In fact, there are several notable data breach and privacy class 
action cases that have contributed to this split of authority. 
2.  Circuits Finding Injury Sufficient for Standing: Third, Sixth, 
Seventh, Ninth, & D.C. 
In the Third Circuit, the decision in In re Horizon involved two stolen 
laptops that contained unencrypted personal information (specifically, 
health insurance data, names, addresses, dates of birth, and social security 
numbers) of more than 839,000 Horizon members.86 Of those with 
information stolen, only one named plaintiff experienced actual misuse 
in the form of a fraudulent tax filing.87 The plaintiffs alleged willful and 
negligent violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and numerous 
violations of state law, centering around Horizon’s failure to take 
reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the stolen laptops and 
safeguard the member’s information.88 In its opinion, the court clarified 
the standing requirements for plaintiffs asserting violations of certain 
federal statutes.89 
The court held that the plaintiffs, by alleging an unauthorized transfer 
of personal identifying information in violation of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, had established a sufficient de facto injury for standing, 
even if that information was not improperly used.90 This decision 
narrowed the lack of standing defense in this particular type of data 
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breach case, where the claim involved arose from certain statutory rights. 
However, the result still leaves open whether other federal statutes may 
recognize data breaches as injuries-in-fact, and whether more technical 
violations of statutes could constitute a harm for standing.  
In the Sixth Circuit, the data breach in Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Co., involved the theft of personal information (specifically, 
names, dates of birth, driver’s license numbers, and social security 
numbers) of 1.1 million customers of Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Company by hackers of the company’s computer network.91 Plaintiffs 
sued Nationwide for violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act (failure to 
adopt adequate procedures to protect personal information) and for 
common law torts of negligence and bailment.92 Plaintiffs alleged that 
they had incurred costs associated with mitigating the risk, including 
purchasing credit reporting and monitoring services for credit reports and 
bank statements.93 Ultimately, a split panel held that plaintiffs had 
sufficiently demonstrated standing by alleging that the Nationwide hack 
had subjected them to significantly heightened risk of fraud and identity 
theft.94  
The court found that even though plaintiffs claimed no incidences of 
actual fraud or identity theft, their claimed injury was not merely 
“hypothetical.”95 The court reasoned, while distinguishing the facts of 
this case from those in Clapper, “[t]here is no need for speculation where 
Plaintiffs allege that their data has already been stolen and is now in the 
hands of ill-intentioned criminals. . . . Where a data breach targets 
personal information, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the 
hackers will use the victims’ data for . . . fraudulent purposes.”96 Further, 
the court also noted that Nationwide seemed to recognize the severity of 
the risk because it offered free credit monitoring and identity theft 
protection for one year; thus Nationwide’s mitigation efforts were 
actually used against them in the end.97 This decision is one of the most 
favorable to plaintiffs in the data breach context because no plaintiffs 
even alleged any actual fraud or identity theft as a result of the data theft. 
In the Seventh Circuit, the data breach in Remijas involved hackers 
attacking Neiman Marcus and stealing the credit card numbers of 
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approximately 350,000 of its customers.98 Some of these customers found 
fraudulent charges on their cards around the same time of the breach.99 
The court asserted that Clapper did not consummately bar consumers 
from bringing suit based on substantial risk of future injury and found 
that the costs incurred by the plaintiffs were material enough to be 
considered particularized injuries.100 Neiman Marcus’ major objection 
was that the plaintiffs could not show that their injuries were fairly 
traceable to the Neiman Marcus breach instead of a breach involving 
Target, which occurred around the same time.101 The court responded by 
stating that, “if there are multiple companies that could have exposed the 
plaintiffs’ private information to hackers, then the common law of torts 
has long shifted the burden of proof to defendants to prove that their 
negligent actions were not the ‘but-for’ cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”102 
The court ultimately held that “injuries associated with resolving 
fraudulent charges and protecting oneself against future identity theft” 
were sufficient to confer Article III standing.103 
In the Ninth Circuit, the data breach in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp. 
involved the theft of a laptop containing the personal information 
(specifically, names, addresses, and social security numbers) of 
Starbucks employees.104 While the leaked information had not yet been 
misused, the plaintiff’s sued Starbucks for negligence and breach of 
implied contract, emphasizing that the data leaked had increased their risk 
of identity theft.105 Here, the court asserted that plaintiffs alleged “a 
credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of the 
laptop containing their unencrypted personal data.”106 It explained that 
had the allegation been more conjectural or hypothetical (i.e., if no laptop 
had been stolen and the plaintiffs sued based on the risk that it would be 
stolen in the future), the threat would be much less credible.107 Thus, 
plaintiff’s satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement for Article III standing 
by stating that an injury-in-fact can be satisfied by a threat of future harm, 
or by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future 
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harm that plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent defendant’s 
actions.108 
Though Krottner occurred before the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Clapper, the Ninth Circuit subsequently decided another data breach case 
in In re Zappos.com, Inc., where it reiterated its expansive view of 
injuries involving the risk of future harm for standing.109 In that case, the 
court unanimously held that plaintiffs, whose personal information 
(specifically, payment card data) was stolen but not actually misused, had 
standing to sue because they faced a substantial risk of identity theft.110 
This is important because it held that Krottner is still good law after the 
decision in Clapper.111  
Finally, in the D.C. Circuit, the data breach in Attias v. CareFirst, Inc. 
involved a cyberattack where 1 million CareFirst’s customers’ personal 
information (specifically, names, dates of birth, email addresses, and 
subscriber information) was stolen.112 Plaintiffs argued that CareFirst 
violated state laws and legal duties by failing to safeguard their 
information and exposing them to an increased risk of identity theft.113 
The court stated that this injury was sufficient to establish standing 
because it was “at the very least . . . plausible” to infer that the hackers 
had the intent and ability to use the stolen data for illegal purposes.114  
The above cases from this side of the circuit split present the hurdles 
a defendant must clear to secure dismissal of a data breach claim. 
Generally, they collectively held that the risk of future harm from a data 
breach was, on its face, injury sufficient for standing. Based on these 
plaintiff-favorable rulings on the standing issue, these circuits will likely 
emerge as the forums of choice for data breach class actions. And as the 
Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in 2018 for CareFirst, this split 
remains in place for the foreseeable future.  
3.  Circuits Finding No Injury Sufficient for Standing: First, Second, 
Fourth, & Eighth 
In the First Circuit, the case of Katz v. Pershing involved a unique set 
of facts in this context because the case was actually filed before any data 
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breach occurred.115 Plaintiff alleged that she experienced an increased 
risk of potential future loss due to the defendant’s alleged failure to 
adhere to reasonable security practices and privacy regulations.116 The 
court held that such allegations were not sufficient to meet the 
requirements for Article III standing.117 It reasoned that the allegations of 
harm were too speculative and could not show impending injury because 
the facts alleged left too many unknown variables, including whether the 
plaintiff’s data would actually be stolen or lost, and even then, whether 
the data would be misused in a way that would harm her.118 Ultimately, 
the plaintiff’s standing theory rested “entirely on the hypothesis that at 
some point an unauthorized, as-yet unidentified, third party might access 
her data and then attempt to purloin her identity.”119 
In the Second Circuit, the data breach in Whalen v. Michaels Stores, 
Inc. involved the theft of customers’ credit card and debit card data 
(specifically, card numbers and expiration dates).120 Relying on the 
standard from Clapper, the court deemed the named plaintiff’s allegation 
of two attempted fraudulent credit card charges insufficient to make the 
risk of future harm “certainly impending.”121 Because plaintiff was never 
asked to pay, nor did she pay, any fraudulent charges and because her 
stolen credit card was promptly canceled after the breach and no other 
personally identifying information (such as her date of birth or social 
security number) was alleged to have been stolen, the court concluded 
that she had alleged no injury that would satisfy the constitutional 
standing requirements of Article III.122 
In the Fourth Circuit, Beck v. McDonald consolidated two cases 
against a Veteran’s hospital.123 The first involved a stolen laptop with 
limited data (specifically, names, dates of birth, last four digits of social 
security numbers, and physical descriptors) and the second involved 
stolen boxes of pathology files with information (specifically, names, 
social security numbers, and medical diagnoses) about deceased 
persons.124 Interestingly, the court denied standing for both sets of facts, 
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but adopted the reasoning from Krottner and Remijas (which, as 
explained above, are on the opposite side of the circuit split), implying 
that some breaches do make future harm certainly impending.125 
Ultimately, it seems that, for this specific case, the fact that three years 
had passed without any visible misuse of the personal information proved 
decisive and the court found that the threat of identity theft stemming 
from these breaches was too speculative to establish an injury-in-fact for 
these claims.126 
In the Eighth Circuit, In re SuperValu, Inc. involved two data breaches 
on a chain of retail grocery stores in which hackers gained access to the 
payment information of customers (specifically, names, credit or debit 
card numbers, card expiration dates, card verification value codes, and 
personal identification numbers).127 The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant failed to take adequate measures to protect customers’ 
information; for example, the defendant allegedly used default or 
common passwords, failing to lock out users after several failed login 
attempts and not segregating access to different parts of the computer 
network or use firewalls to protect customer information.128 The plaintiffs 
claimed that customer information was stolen as a result of the breaches, 
subjecting plaintiffs to “an imminent and real possibility of identity 
theft.”129 One plaintiff also alleged that he suffered a fraudulent charge 
on his credit card statement, resulting in the replacement of the card.130 
In the end, however, the court found that the individual plaintiffs who had 
not experienced any fraudulent charges or identity theft following the 
breaches and had not sufficiently alleged a substantial risk of future 
injury.131 But the court did find that the injury of the one plaintiff who 
alleged fraudulent use of this card gave rise to standing in his individual 
case.132 
The above cases from this side of the circuit split have generally held 
that plaintiffs must allege an actual injury in the form of fraudulent 
charges on existing credit or debit card accounts or the opening of 
fraudulent financial accounts resulting from their stolen personal 
information to establish the requisite injury-in-fact for Article III 
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standing. They have determined that general allegations of a heightened 
risk of identity theft from stolen personal information alone do not 
constitute an injury-in-fact, raising the pleading requirements for 
plaintiffs in data breach cases in these jurisdictions. Thus, with the circuit 
split firmly in place, the potential for standing will largely depend on both 
where the suit is filed and on that court’s interpretation of the standard to 
prove sufficient standing.133 
B.  Next Step: Causation & Redressability 
For those cases that are fortunate enough based on their particular 
factual situations to make it past the first hurdle of injury-in-fact for 
Article III standing, the next challenge presented focuses on causation 
and redressability. The data breach context presents a somewhat unique 
circumstance surrounding causation (typically meaning that the injury 
must be fairly traceable) because of the ability of a data thief to aggregate 
data from multiple sources. This creates issues for courts who enforce a 
strict “rule of enablement,” which means that the data stolen must have 
been sufficient by itself to enable the alleged misuse.134 And while 
forensic testing may reveal how a breach was achieved and what data was 
stolen, such evidence-based results seldom exist to prove a direct 
connection between the act of the breach and a particular subsequent 
misuse that resulted in injury.135  
As noted by the court in Remijas above, once a set of mostly 
immutable personal information has been involved in multiple breaches, 
causation becomes an even harder element to prove.136 Courts have 
approached this issue in different ways. Most notable from a public policy 
standpoint was that of In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Security Breach 
Litigation, where the court “refused to consider that any instances of 
actual misuse might have resulted from other data breaches, as this would 
create a perverse incentive for stewards of consumer data.”137 But some 
courts analyzing data breach cases deem that this standing requirement 
has been satisfied where a business admits customer information has been 
exposed by issuing data breach notifications (as they are legally required 
to give such notifications under state privacy laws) or where a business 
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issues new customer cards themselves due to a breach.138 Ultimately, 
some courts are more reluctant than others to recognize causation, so 
jurisdiction choice will also impact this outcome regarding the standing 
determination. 
Redressability is the final step in the Article III standing analysis, and 
it has been invoked the least often in data breach cases.139 The injurious 
standard to satisfy is that “it must be likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that [an] injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”140 
Major issues in this area typically center around failures to allege any 
quantifiable damages resulting from the breach and instances where 
credit card companies or other parties have already remedied some of the 
victims’ injuries.141 If these issues are present, the plaintiffs’ claimed 
injuries may struggle to pass the test for redressability. 
III.  ATTEMPTS AT A FEDERAL STANDARD & FORTHCOMING STATE 
LEGISLATION 
Though there have been a number of attempts at passing a uniform 
federal standard, the United States lacks a comprehensive federal law that 
regulates the collection and use of consumer personal information. As a 
result, many states have passed their own laws, which often contain 
different and sometimes incompatible provisions regarding what 
categories and types of personal information are protected or which 
entities are covered. In addition, the judicial circuits have also diverted 
from a single interpretation in the data breach standing context, which 
only adds to the inconsistency and confusion across the board. Congress’s 
ability to successfully pass a uniform federal data breach standard is 
highly dependent on the political state of the country, and with the current 
stark divide surrounding political views on the subject of federal 
regulation, such a federal standard is not likely to be enacted anytime 
soon. Fortunately, California’s new privacy regulation possesses the 
potential to cause a seismic shift in the landscape of data privacy law, not 
just in California, but across the country. 
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A.  Attempts at a Federal Standard 
Many have called on Congress to enact flexible and technologically 
neutral privacy and security laws. For example, in 2014, the “Data 
Security Breach Notification Act” was introduced in the Senate; however, 
it did not move past referral to a Senate subcommittee.142 Then, the 
Barack Obama presidential administration put forth plans in 2015 for the 
“Personal Data Notification & Protection Act,” which proposed many 
measures aimed at promoting data security, data privacy, and protection 
against identity theft, including a “Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.”143 
This was largely based on the Fair Information Practice Principles, which 
are thought of as general processes and procedures that organizations 
should implement, recognizing that Americans have a strong interest in 
how information about them is collected, used, and shared by 
companies.144  
The 2015 Act aimed to protect “sensitive personally identifiable 
information,” including: (1) first and last name in combination with 
several different elements; (2) a government-issued identification 
number, including a social security number or driver’s license number; 
(3) biometric data including fingerprints or voice prints; (4) unique 
account identifiers; and (5) a username in combination with a password 
or security question.145 It also contained a strict standard of notification 
requirements which would have been enforced by the Federal Trade 
Commission and state Attorney Generals.146 A major point of contention 
in this bill was that the Personal Data Notification & Protection Act 
would supersede any state laws covering breaches of computerized data 
from businesses.147 Unfortunately, this proposal lost momentum shortly 
after a draft of the bill was put forward and it also did not move past 
subcommittee review.148 Most recently, the Donald J. Trump presidential 
 
 142. See Martha Wrangham & Gretchen A. Ramos, Calls for Federal Breach Notification 
Law Continue After Yahoo Data Breach, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.natlaw 
review.com/article/calls-federal-breach-notification-law-continue-after-yahoo-data-breach. 
 143. See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, FACT SHEET: SAFEGUARDING AMERICAN CONSUMERS 
& FAMILIES (Jan. 12, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/12/ 
fact-sheet-safeguarding-american-consumers-families. 
 144. See Brendan McDermid, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-
data-protection. 
 145. Personal Data Notification & Protection Act, H.R. 1704, 114th Cong. § 112(12) (2015). 
 146. Id. at § 101(c); see also id. §§ 107–108 (explaining the rules and methods of 
enforcement). 
 147. See id. § 109. 
 148. See Wrangham & Ramos, supra note 142. 
 
 
74 JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY [Vol. 24 
 
 
administration’s lack of appetite for technology policy or regulation in 
general has left this issue and any attempts at a federal data breach 
standard at a standstill for the foreseeable future.149  
B.  The California Consumer Privacy Act 
California has always had a strong policy regarding the subject of 
privacy, often enumerating more elaborate and stricter privacy laws than 
other states. In fact, California even enumerated the right to privacy in its 
constitution.150 Once again, California is charging forward in the world 
of privacy legislation and on June 28, 2018, with subsequent minor 
amendments, it has enacted the California Consumer Privacy Act 
(CCPA).151 The CCPA will go into effect starting January 1, 2020, and it 
will generally restrict certain businesses’ ability to collect and sell the 
“personal information” of consumers.152 Though the CCPA will take 
effect in a single state, its reach will extend well beyond the borders of 
California, and its expansive protections mark a major shift in the nation’s 
data privacy regime.153 
The CCPA applies to any for-profit business (regardless of where it is 
located) that collects the personal information of California residents and 
satisfies at least one of the following criteria:  
(1) generates gross revenues above $25 million (and such 
threshold is not limited to revenue earned in the State of 
California), (2) engages in the buying, selling, receiving, or 
sharing of the personal information of at least 50,000 
California residents, households, or internet-connected 
devices, or (3) derives at least 50% of its annual revenues 
from the sale of consumers’ personal information.154  
The definition of this type of business for purposes of the CCPA also 
includes “[a]ny entity that controls or is controlled by a business, as 
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defined in [the main “business” definition], and that shares common 
branding with the business.155   
The CCPA also contains a limited number of exemptions to the 
definition of “business.” If every aspect of the commercial conduct takes 
place wholly outside of California, then such business is exempt from the 
CCPA.156 Also exempted from its coverage is the collection of certain 
information covered by other statutes, including HIPAA, the FCRA, the 
GLBA, and the DPPA, as well as “publicly available information,” which 
includes information lawfully made available from government 
records.157 The CCPA’s definition of “personal information” is very 
inclusive, encompassing all “information that identifies, relates to, 
describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be 
linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”158 
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Such a broad definition illustrates the intent of the CCPA’s drafters 
regarding the statute’s breath and its ability to provide expansive 
protections to consumers.159 And ultimately, even with the exemptions, 
these provisions will likely reach a considerable number of businesses 
with a website accessible in California. 
The CCPA confers three major “rights” on consumers: the “right to 
know,” the “right to opt out,” and the “right to delete.”160 The “right to 
know” is derived from the fact that businesses must, in advance of any 
collection, “inform consumers [by mail or electronically] as to the 
categories of personal information to be collected and the purposes for 
which the categories of personal information shall be used.”161 Further, 
in addition to requiring this advance collection disclosure, consumers also 
have the right to request that a business that collects personal information 
about the consumer disclose to the consumer the specific pieces of 
personal information that the business has collected or sold from the 
consumer, the categories of sources from which the information was 
collected, the business purposes for collecting or selling the personal 
information, and the third parties with whom the information was 
shared.162 
Next, the “right to opt out” derives from the requirement that 
businesses must inform consumers of the right to opt out of the sale of a 
consumer’s information, and if a consumer so directs a business not to 
sell the consumer’s personal information, the business cannot again sell 
the consumer’s information unless the consumer subsequently provides 
the business express authorization.163 It also requires an affirmative “opt 
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in” for consumers under the age of 16 (by the consumer directly if they 
are between the ages of 13 and 16 or by the consumer’s parent of guardian 
if the consumer is under 13).164 Finally, the “right to delete” derives from 
the requirement that businesses, if requested by a consumer, must delete 
any information collected about such consumer.165 The CCPA provides 
some exceptions to this right, including: when the information is needed 
to complete a particular transaction for the consumer, to detect security 
incidents or protect against fraud, or where such retention enables solely 
internal uses that are reasonably aligned with the expectations of the 
consumer based on the consumer’s relationship with the business.166 
As an additional protection for consumers, the CCPA contains a 
nondiscrimination rule to backstop the discussed rights. Specifically, it 
provides that no business may discriminate against a consumer by 
“denying goods or services,” by “charging different prices or rates,” or 
by “providing a different level or quality of goods or services” to 
consumers who exercise their rights under the CCPA.167 However, the 
CCPA does allow businesses to “offer financial incentives” for the 
collection, sale, or non-deletion of personal information. It also provides 
that a business may offer a different price to consumers who exercise their 
rights “if that price . . . is directly related to the value provided to the 
consumer by the consumer’s data.”168  
Enforcement of the CCPA will largely fall under the authority of the 
California Attorney General. Businesses that are in violation of the CCPA 
and do not cure those violations within 30 days are liable for civil 
penalties of up to $2,500 for each violation, which increases to $7,500 if 
the violation is intentional.169 Moreover, it gives California residents a 
civil right of action for injunctive or declaratory relief, as well as 
monetary damages (no less than $100 and no more than $750 per 
incident, or actual damages, whichever is greater) against businesses that 
fail to implement reasonable security measures to protect their personal 
information.170 Significantly, “reasonable security measures” are not 
defined by the CCPA, and in the absence of a specified definition, a 
definition will likely be determined by the judicial system and analyzed 
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on a case-by-case basis.  Such actions can only be brought if a consumer 
provides a business with 30 days’ written notice and provides the 
business with the opportunity to “cure” the violation, unless the consumer 
suffered actual pecuniary damages.171 This safe harbor cuts both ways: 
on the one hand, it will provide business with advance notice of the claims 
and the ability to engage plaintiffs before litigation progresses; and on the 
other hand, because of the uncertainty in the statute as drafted (i.e., how 
to “cure” is not defined), it is not clear what an actual cure of a data breach 
would look like.172 
Overall, the CCPA will regulate how businesses with an online 
presence in California collect, share, and use consumer personal 
information. This unprecedented change in California’s privacy law will 
invite an explosion of consumer litigation as plaintiffs seek to recover 
statutory damages under the private right of action.173 Whereas thus far, 
plaintiffs have often struggled to sufficiently demonstrate that theft of 
their data has resulted in an injury-in-fact for standing purposes, the new 
allowance for statutory damages has cleared a major litigation hurdle for 
plaintiffs since they will no longer need to demonstrate that an actual 
financial injury has been suffered.174 It is very likely that because of its 
expansive scope and jurisdictional reach, the CCPA will become the 
standard for best practices in privacy and data protection for United States 
residents unless it is later preempted by federal law, or another state 
adopts a law with more demanding requirements.  
IV.  POTENTIAL MITIGATION OF LITIGATION EXPOSURE 
The best chance for avoiding litigation exposure from the company’s 
perspective, is to implement adequate security measures to prevent data 
breaches in the first place. As previously stated, the federal and state data 
security statutes generally require that companies in possession of 
customer personal information implement adequate security measures, 
though they do not offer any further explanation of what would qualify 
or how such companies should assess vulnerabilities. For some guidance 
on this matter, the Center for Internet Security’s Critical Security 
Controls identifies a minimum level of information security that all 
organizations that collect or maintain personal information should meet 
in order to meet the standard for reasonable security.175 The minimum 
security controls for effective cyber defense are listed below.176 
 
 171. Id. § 1798.150(b).  
 172. See Buese, supra note 22. 
 173. See Buese, supra note 22. 
 174. See Buese, supra note 22. 
 175. See HARRIS, supra note 21, at 30. 
 176. See HARRIS, supra note 21, app. at 39. 






CSC 1 Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices  
CSC 2 Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software  
CSC 3 Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Mobile Devices, 
Laptops, Workstations and Servers  
CSC 4 Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation  
CSC 5 Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges  
CSC 6 Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs  
CSC 7 Email and Web Browser Protection  
CSC 8 Malware Defenses  
CSC 9 Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services  
CSC 10 Data Recovery Capability  
CSC 11 Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers, 
and Switches  
CSC 12 Boundary Defense  
CSC 13 Data Protection  
CSC 14 Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know  
CSC 15 Wireless Access Control  
CSC 16 Account Monitoring and Control  
CSC 17 Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps  
CSC 18 Application Software Security  
CSC 19 Incident Response and Management  
CSC 20 Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises  
 
These controls should serve as a starting point, and the failure to 
implement all twenty that apply to a particular company’s data 
environment could constitute a lack of reasonable security.177 
Further, companies should make multi-factor authentication available 
on consumer-facing online accounts that contain sensitive personal 
information, such as requiring something biometric (i.e., a fingerprint) or 
an additional code to enter that comes through as a text or other one-time-
password token.178 Such requirements would make it much more difficult 
for a third party to breach the account because access to the account 
would require more than just the baseline username and password 
combination. Companies are also well advised to consistently use strong 
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encryption methods to protect personal information on mobile electronic 
devices (such as laptop computers or smart phones) that could be 
physically lost or stolen.179 Ultimately, in this context the motto really is 
“better safe than sorry.” When in doubt it is better to implement as many 
security controls as are feasibly possible for the particular type and size 
of the company, based upon the sensitivity of the stored personal 
information.   
Additional methods for reducing a company’s litigation exposure 
incorporate the use of an arbitration clause and a class action waiver in 
the website’s terms and conditions, which could prohibit users from 
prompting mass litigation.180 The Supreme Court has confirmed that class 
action waivers in arbitrations provisions are enforceable.181 Such 
arbitration provisions and waivers should be conspicuous both in the 
company’s notice of its terms and conditions for service, and in the terms 
and conditions themselves.182 For example, to maximize the likelihood of 
enforcement, they should be “easily accessible and displayed in a 
sufficiently large viewing window to provide the user an adequate 
opportunity to review the terms, thereby eliminating any doubts that a 
reasonable user would have noticed them” and they should include easily 
understandable, balanced provisions to avoid a finding of 
unconscionability.183 Additionally, best practices would require users to 
affirmatively accept the contractual terms before proceeding to the next 
step in the transaction or service provided.184 
CONCLUSION 
Protection of consumer personal information is a major issue faced 
not only by Americans, but by consumers across the globe. Both the 
frequency and severity of data breaches in the modern day of technology 
and internet usage have consistently increased throughout the twentieth 
century, developing into what some consider to be a modern “data breach 
epidemic.” Neither federal nor state regulations fully address this 
epidemic in a way that provides consumers and businesses with clarity 
regarding their respective rights and duties post-data breach.185 After their 
personal information is exposed, consumers face uncertainty in seeking 
relief, and the current circuit split in this area makes the choice of where 
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to file a claim of paramount importance if the injury is based on the theory 
of an increased risk of future harm (such as the increased risk for identity 
theft). From the perspective of businesses in possession of consumer 
personal information, conflicting laws relating to compliance creates an 
unnecessary burden for large businesses that operate in multiple 
jurisdictions.  
There have been some attempts at a federal standard, but none have 
ultimately succeeded. Though it seems unlikely under the current 
political climate, enacting a federal data breach notification and data 
protection statute would go a long way in solving many of the issues 
currently faced by consumers and businesses. Confronted with this 
intimidating and rapidly changing technological landscape, California’s 
new sweeping privacy legislation, the CCPA (effective January 1, 2020), 
will impose a multitude of new, extremely demanding notice, disclosure, 
and consent requirements on an array of business entities that conduct 
operations or handle the personal information of California residents. The 
CCPA will likely cause a shift in the landscape of data privacy law not 
just in California, but across the entire United States. 
The data breach epidemic is not going away anytime soon, so in the 
meantime consumers should take extra precautions when evaluating 
whether, and with whom, they share their personal information. 
Additionally, businesses that use, collect, or store consumer personal 
information should maximize their security controls in place to prevent 
or decrease the likelihood of a data breach, and should also incorporate 
the use of both class action waivers and mandatory arbitration provisions 
to mitigate the potential effects of post-data breach litigation. 
